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Is the Grass Greener? Switching Costs and Geographic Proximity in the High Status 






Professional baseball operates a tiered system of talent development facilitated by alliances 
between Minor League Baseball (MiLB) clubs and higher status Major League Baseball 
(MLB) parent teams. This study applies management theory to advance the literature on 
MiLB demand modeling by proposing and testing a new set of demand determinants based 
on interorganizational alliance principles. Team executives at the AA level should be alert 
to the high cost of switching team alliances and of changing to a parent club in closer 
geographical proximity.  At the AAA level, affiliation with a winning MLB club exerts a 
positive effect on AAA demand. 
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Is the Grass Greener? Switching Costs and Geographic Proximity in the High Status 
Affiliations of Professional Baseball 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the endorsement benefits of securing high status alliance partners in close 
proximity frequently outweigh the potential drawbacks of being overshadowed by such 
partners, industry nuances often complicate these alliance decisions (e.g., Castellucci and 
Ertug, 2010; Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009).  Such is the case in professional baseball, where 
a tiered system of interorganizational alliances facilitates talent development while 
delivering both sports entertainment to spectators and promotional vehicles for corporate 
sponsors.  Minor League Baseball (MiLB) has grown dramatically in popularity in the past 
thirty years as evidenced by attendance gains in 26 of the past 31 seasons (Minor League 
Baseball, 2013). With over 41 million annual fans, MiLB boasts higher total attendance 
than the National Basketball Association, National Football League, or National Hockey 
League.   
In the past decade, Major League Baseball (MLB) teams have changed their 
business strategy in terms of alliances with minor league teams (Belson, 2009).  Whereas 
MLB teams once kept their minor league affiliates at a geographic distance, the trend has 
recently reversed.  Minor league teams clustered in closer geographic proximity to the 
parent team (i.e., MLB team) are now perceived as more desirable for contractual affiliation 
for a variety of reasons.  For example, minor league games serve as additional 
programming for MLB-team owned regional sports networks; closer minor league affiliates 
can reduce player and administrative travel time and cost; and MLB teams can develop 
marketing and promotions that involve all of the regional teams (Belson, 2009).   
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Despite these benefits for the MLB parent club, minor league team executives face 
the affiliation decision from a different perspective.  The objective of this research is to 
apply management theory in the context of baseball to empirically determine what 
characteristics of potential major league affiliates are relevant to minor league executives 
when negotiating with MLB teams.  For example, should a minor league team align with a 
winning MLB club, a MLB club in a larger market, or one that is geographically closer to 
the minor league team?  An alliance with a closer MLB parent club may siphon attendance 
from the MiLB club because the MLB team acts as a higher status substitute for sports 
entertainment and more specifically, the product of baseball.  On the other hand, a strong 
regional following for a MLB team could conceivably drive residual demand for a local 
minor league affiliate by creating a regional culture of baseball (Belson, 2009).  
To date, the minor league affiliation decision has been made with little information 
as to the optimal, attendance-maximizing criteria.  In general, strategic alliance theory 
suggests that larger or higher status firms offer greater partnership potential (Castellucci 
and Ertug, 2010; Dyer and Singh, 1998), but research has illustrated that firms changing 
alliances often suffer switching costs that negate marginal gains from improved 
partnerships (Nielson, 1996).   
Our theoretical approach adopts one side of the value maximization perspective of 
strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 2000).  Specifically, we investigate the influence of MLB 
parent clubs on the MiLB affiliate’s game day attendance.  To do so, we raise the following 
questions: 
1. Does geographical proximity to the MLB affiliate benefit the minor league team?  
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2. Do performance features such as the quality or status of the MLB affiliate benefit 
the minor league team?  
3a. Is there a switching cost for MiLB teams that change their MLB affiliation?   
3b. Are switching costs mitigated by aligning with a higher quality or higher status 
MLB partner? 
This study incorporates a classic demand equation coupled with interorganizational 
alliance theory to determine whether minor league teams at the two highest levels—AAA 
and AA—realize attendance effects from changing their MLB parent club.  These results 
enhance the decision making capabilities of minor league executives by analyzing criteria 
through which MLB partner clubs may benefit the minor league organization.      
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current relationship between MLB and minor league baseball teams can be 
characterized as a strategic alliance.  Although the literature offers multiple definitions of 
strategic alliances (e.g., Gulati, 1999; Saxton, 1997; Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995), 
they all include the elements of cooperative relationships and resource exchange.  For 
example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996, p. 137) describe alliances as “cooperative 
relationships driven by a logic of strategic resource needs and social resource 
opportunities,” while Das & Teng (2000, p.33) define alliances as “voluntary cooperative 
inter-firm agreements aimed at achieving competitive advantage for the partners.” 
Historically, major league teams owned minor league teams and used them as a 
vehicle to develop players.  In this vertically integrated system, major league teams 
maximized both their profits and their monopsony power by controlling their inputs to 
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production.  In 1950, MLB teams began to divest of their MiLB holdings and outsourced 
their player development system to private owners (Hoie, 1993).  Yet, MLB owners 
attempted to maintain some control over their inputs through strategic alliances with the 
minor league teams.  Two contracts govern this relationship.  The Professional Baseball 
Agreement (PBA) governs the relationship between MLB and MiLB, the umbrella 
organization for all affiliated minor league teams.  A separate Player Development Contract 
(PDC) defines the alliance between a major league team and its minor league affiliate.  
These PDCs tie a major and minor league team together for two or four-year terms and are 
negotiated and signed in even numbered years.  Inherent in each of these contracts are the 
explicit terms of their cooperative relationship and resource exchange.  The financial terms 
of the PDCs are uniform across clubs as dictated by the PBA.  Furthermore, MLB teams are 
prohibited from including enticements such as exhibition games to convince a minor league 
club to sign with their major league club versus another.  Thus, the lack of variation 
between these contracts acts as a natural control that makes the baseball context a 
particularly suitable and interesting environment to isolate certain alliance factors and study 
changes in partner relationships.   
The broad purpose of a strategic alliance is to realize optimal strategic returns by 
creating and enhancing firm resources through combination with another organization’s 
resources (Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995).  In these terms, MLB combines their 
assets with those of their minor league affiliates to develop players and enhance demand for 
baseball as a spectator sport.  In the most simplistic terms, MLB teams provide their MiLB 
affiliated teams with labor resources in the form of players and coaches, while minor league 
teams provide the physical infrastructure and organizational resources for player 
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development, such as a venue, concessions, parking, customer service, ticketing, and a local 
brand identity.  The MLB parent clubs pay the salaries of MiLB players and coaches while 
minor league teams send a standardized portion of ticket revenue to their parent club as 
dictated by the PBA.  Although the physical assets are the primary basis for their 
contractual agreement, the intangible asset exchange is also vital to this cooperative 
relationship.  MiLB teams provide live baseball games to fans throughout the country who 
may not otherwise be able to attend a MLB game (Sullivan, 1990).  This domain (i.e., 
baseball) involvement cultivates a potential fan base for MLB, connects recreational and 
former players to the professional game, and serves as a mechanism for increasing brand 
awareness and image association for the parent MLB team when its brand is shared with its 
minor league affiliate (Krauss, 2003).  
To illustrate changes in such alliances and the potential considerations on each side 
of the team partnership, consider the case of the Kentucky-based Louisville Bats.  In their 
32-year history as a AAA team, the Bats have been affiliated with three MLB parent clubs 
beginning with the St. Louis Cardinals located 260 miles from Louisville (Karman, 2011). 
During their affiliation with the Cardinals, the Bats twice set MiLB attendance records.  
When their league—the American Association—folded after the 1997 season (discussed 
further later in this paper), the Louisville Bats joined the International League but lost their 
Cardinals’ alliance to a MiLB expansion team in Memphis, Tennessee (283 miles from St. 
Louis).  As a result, the Bats were forced to seek a new MLB team alliance for 1998 and 
found a partner in the Milwaukee Brewers located 394 miles from Louisville.  However, 
with a new stadium opening for the 2000 season, the Bats were able to forge an affiliation 
alliance with the Cincinnati Reds located 99 miles from Louisville.  Although Indianapolis 
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had produced the best record in AAA as the Reds’ partner, there were philosophical 
differences in how players were developed and the Red were seeking a new AAA affiliate 
(Byczkowski, 1999).  Commenting on the change in MLB alliance, a Bats team executive 
labeled the Reds as “the team of choice in Louisville…no matter who we’re affiliated 
with.”  Likewise, a Reds executive claimed Louisville as “Reds country” whereas the 
Indianapolis market shares allegiances with the Chicago MLB teams (Byczkowski, 1999).  
This anecdotal case characterizes several of the factors at play within the alliance decision 
for major and minor league clubs. 
2.1 Demand Theory  
The resource based view of strategic alliances looks to value maximization as the 
criteria by which to evaluate the success of a partnership (Das and Teng, 2000).  Similarly, 
economic theory measures firm success through profit maximization which, in sports, has 
most often been operationalized as attendance demand (see Borland and Macdonald, 2003, 
for a review).  Traditional demand theory models attendance as a function of price, quality 
(win percent, new stadium), substitutes (MLB teams and stadiums), and income (per capita 
income) (Gitter and Rhoads, 2010).  Therefore, certain controls are warranted when 
evaluating our research questions, which focus on how affiliation partner alliances may 
influence attendance demand for minor league teams.  Although less work has been 
undertaken on minor league baseball, existing research has shown that significant demand 
features in one classification (AAA, AA, A or rookie) may be insignificant in other 
classifications (Branvold et al., 1997; Gitter and Rhoads, 2010; Roy 2008).  To this extent, 
we anticipate the potential for different effects between the AAA and AA classifications 
tested in this study1. 




In terms of MiLB team quality, attendance appears unaffected by the team’s win 
percentage at the AAA level, where previous researchers have suggested that demand is 
more contingent on the brand of the major league affiliate (Branvold et al., 1997; Gitter and 
Rhoads, 2010).  On the other hand, team quality at the AA level has been confirmed as a 
statistically significant determinant of attendance (Branvold et al., 1997; Gitter and Rhoads, 
2010).  As a result, we expect MiLB team quality operationalized as win percentage to 
follow this established pattern and be significantly positive at the AA level and 
insignificant at the AAA level. 
A second feature of quality in the attendance demand of sports teams is the facility.  
New stadiums in major league baseball have a well-documented honeymoon effect (Clapp 
and Hakes, 2005).  Demand modeling at the minor league level has also demonstrated new 
stadiums are associated with increased attendance (Gitter and Rhoads, 2014; Roy, 2008).  
We control for this effect in a way identical to Gitter and Rhoads (2014) with separate 
dummies that identify the first ten years of a new minor league stadium. 
Beyond quality, available substitutes are also relevant to modeling demand.  MiLB 
has long been marketed as not just sport but also entertainment (Johnson, 1995).  To that 
extent, a substitute for a minor league game could include any other local entertainment 
establishment such as movie theaters, public swimming pools, or the local bowling alley.  
Moreover, there is mounting evidence that sports fans who attend minor league games also 
substitute major league games and vice versa (Winfree and Fort, 2008).  When looking 
specifically at ticket price, Gitter and Rhoads (2010) show that a minor league team will 
experience an increase in attendance if a MLB team within 100 miles increases its ticket 
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price.  This finding implies that price sensitive sports consumers are willing to substitute 
different levels of baseball.   
At the same time, MLB teams with winning records and with new stadiums 
experience significant increases in attendance, often at the expense of other local leisure 
activities that include minor league baseball (Gitter and Rhoads, 2010).  Thus to accurately 
address our research questions, we include a dummy for the first five years of a new MLB 
stadium within 100 miles of a minor league team as a measure of substitute products likely 
to decrease demand for MiLB.  
2.3 Geographic Proximity  
While various forms of proximity (e.g., organizational or geographical) often act as 
alliance complements in positively impacting partnering firms’ performance (Oerlemans 
and Meeus, 2005), there has been little evidence to demonstrate whether the trend of MLB 
teams clustering minor league teams in closer geographic proximity yields benefits for 
minor league teams.  Two elements of strategic alliance theory suggest potential benefits to 
the minor league club.  First, closer geographic proximity between alliance partners can 
facilitate sharing of knowledge and relation-specific assets (Dyer, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 
1998).  Second, multiple aligned organizations can benefit from a single, strong, regional 
brand (Rao and Ruekert, 1994).   
In the professional baseball context, a MLB team in the area may cultivate a culture 
of baseball and thereby encourage more people to be involved with the sport at any level.  
For example, the Boston Red Sox have created an intense regional following that benefits 
their affiliated minor league teams with regional proximity in Pawtucket, RI (class AAA), 
Portland, ME (class AA), and Lowell, MA (class A) (Chattman and Tarantino, 2013).  
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Finally, the extent to which there is a positive regional branding effect may be a function of 
exact distance.  While some proximity could bring benefits to the MiLB team, too close a 
proximity could be harmful to the distinctiveness of the minor league team (Boschma, 
2005).  To investigate these properties, we measure the distance between a MLB parent 
club and its minor league affiliate both linearly and quadratically. 
2.4 Partner Quality 
  Research on interorganizational alliances suggests lesser known firms often look to 
alliances with more prominent firms to generate legitimacy in the marketplace (Stuart et al., 
1999).  Specifically, aligning with a well-known brand viewed as high quality acts as a 
signal of quality attributed to the partnering brand (Rao and Ruekert, 1994; Wernerfelt, 
1988).  In baseball, when Branvold et al. (1997) found that winning (i.e., team quality) has 
distinctly different effects on attendance at different classification levels, the frequently 
assumed link between team quality and demand became more complicated.  While winning 
at the MLB level positively influences demand at that major league level (e.g. Borland and 
MacDonald, 2003), could the MLB brand be so powerful that parent team quality also 
affects demand at the affiliated AAA level?  If so, the quality of the AAA team itself may 
be insignificant because AAA spectators focus instead on high quality individual sporting 
talent in the form of star players sent down to AAA from the MLB parent club and new star 
players headed up the labor supply chain to a MLB team.   
Gitter and Rhoads (2010) found exactly this effect; a MLB team’s winning has a 
positive impact on nearby minor league attendance when the MLB team is affiliated with 
the minor league team.  However, like Gitter and Rhoads, we suspect this partner quality 
effect only applies to AAA and not the step below in AA baseball, where the talent is 
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further removed from the alliance signal of quality—the parent MLB team.  To test this 
assertion, we include in our minor league attendance model a variable that quantifies the 
winning percentage of the parent MLB club to represent partner quality.  We expect the 
variable to be influential at the AAA level but not the lower AA level. 
2.5 Partner Status 
 In addition to signals of quality, alliance partners can also indicate status.   
Theoretically, status is related to quality in that status partly reflects attributions of quality 
over time (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010).  Furthermore, Castellucci and Ertug illustrated in a 
sporting context that elevated partner status positively influences effort from the partner 
with lower status and thereby enhances partnership outcomes.  Beyond motivating effort, 
higher status partners also offer an enhanced perception of interorganizational endorsement 
(Stuart et al., 1999).  By attracting a high status partner, the lower status partner is deemed 
worth the reputational risk for the high status partner to realize the anticipated outcomes of 
the alliance.  At the major league level, we have already seen that attendance is a function 
of team quality (i.e., winning) and since status reflects quality, we consider MLB 
attendance as one representation of alliance partner status.   
In addition to attendance, MLB team status has also been linked to market 
population (Noll, 1974).  A MLB club in a larger market has more potential local fans than 
one in a smaller market, which provides the large market team with enhanced prospects for 
revenue generation through not only game attendance but also merchandise sales, local 
broadcast contracts, and corporate sponsorship.  Consequently, market size has long been at 
the center of debates on revenue sharing and luxury taxes in MLB (Burger and Walters, 
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2003).  Thus, we also include the population of the market in which the MLB parent club 
resides as a proxy for partner status2. 
2.6 Switching Cost 
Although changing to a closer partner or one of higher quality or status may offer 
benefits to a firm, such alliance changes entail switching costs in disruption of tangible and 
intangible relationship-specific assets (Nielson, 1996).  Switching costs can be 
psychological, physical, or economic in nature (Sengupta et al., 1997).  A MiLB team relies 
on their MLB affiliate to supply labor in the form of players signed to minor league 
contracts (or assigned to the minor leagues for development) as well as the financial 
compensation of those players.  Beyond human and economic resources, collaborative 
routines in knowledge sharing and management procedures established over the course of 
an alliance also enhance switching costs (Nielson, 1996).  Furthermore, the MLB parent 
club supplies their MiLB affiliate and fans with a brand association to professional baseball 
at the highest level.   
By switching their MLB parent club, a MiLB team passes psychological dimensions 
of these switching costs onto their fans.  For example, fans of a particular MiLB team are 
faced with a completely new roster of players when the MLB parent club changes and any 
owned merchandise featuring the previous MLB affiliate is now out of date.  Consequently, 
we expect switching MLB team affiliation to be associated with a negative disruption in 
demand marked by a decrease in attendance for the MiLB team.  Yet, not all affiliation 
changes may result in a uniform attendance effect.  Given the theory discussed above, we 
hypothesize the switching cost to be attenuated by the geographic proximity, quality, and 
status of the new MLB affiliate.  To account for this variation, we include continuous 
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measures of changes in the parent club’s distance, population, win percentage, and 
attendance.   
Furthermore, although PDCs are negotiated and signed at the end of the season in 
an even year (with the on-field changes occurring in the next odd year), there are 
occasionally times when a team changes its affiliation in an “off” year (e.g. signing in an 
odd numbered year with on-field changes occurring in the next even year).  Sometimes 
these off cycle changes are indicative of turmoil at the minor league level resulting in 
attendance decreases that are not related to switching strategic partners.  More often, these 
off cycle changes are the result of structural changes in the major and minor league 
landscape.  For instance, in 1997 the AAA American Association folded and in 1998 some 
of its teams joined the AAA International League and AAA Pacific Coast League, which 
necessitated some off cycle affiliation changes.  Moreover, MLB added two new teams in 
1998, which required the addition of two new AAA teams and associated affiliation 
changes at all levels of minor league baseball.  We include an off cycle dummy to ensure 
that these non-traditional changes are captured separately from switching costs. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To empirically test our research questions, 20 years of annual team attendance data 
from minor league baseball was regressed on alliance-related affiliate characteristics and 
known demand factors.  Specifically,    
 yjt = β1Xjt + β2Zjt + Tt + υj + εjt  
where yjt is the natural log of annual attendance for team j at time t, Xjt is a vector of minor 
league demand variables and Zjt is a vector of MLB affiliation variables. A time trend (Tt) 
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controls for increasing minor league attendance over time, city-specific fixed-effects (υj) 
control for unobserved characteristics that are unique to each city, and εjt is a random 
disturbance.  Similar to Gitter and Rhoads (2010), we include a dummy for the years 1994 
and 1995 because minor league baseball experienced increased attendance in the face of the 
lengthy MLB strike.   
 The dependent variable is the natural log of annual attendance.  To isolate the effect 
of the alliance variables and determine whether geographical proximity to a MLB parent 
club or measures of quality and status of a parent club benefit the minor league team, our 
independent variables control for minor league team win percentage, 10 years of dummies 
for a new minor league stadium, a five year dummy for a new MLB stadium within 100 
miles, and major league affiliate measures of distance, distance squared, population, win 
percentage, and attendance.  
To answer the questions of whether an affiliate alliance switching cost is prevalent 
and if changing to a higher status MLB partner mitigates any associated costs, dummy 
variables are included to indicate whether a minor league team switched affiliates and 
whether this was an off cycle change.  In the case of an affiliation change, four continuous 
variables measure the change in distance, population, win percent, and attendance between 
the old and new MLB parent clubs.  The empirical specification is 
 lnAttendance = β0 + β1WinPct + β2-11MiLBStadiumyear1-10 + β12StrikeDummy + 
β13NewMLBStadium + β14ParentDistance + β15ParentDistanceSq + β16ParentWinPct + 
β17ParentAttendance + β18ParentPopulation + β19ChangeAffiliationDummy + 
β20OffcycleChangeDummy + β21ChangeInParentDistance + β22ChangeInParentWpct + 
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β23ChangeParentAttendance + β24ChangeParentPopulation + β25TimeTrend + city fixed-
effects + ε 
Ordinary least squares is used to estimate the AAA and AA classifications 
separately.  A Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity indicates the 
need for robust standard errors in both AAA (χ2= 53.82, p < .01) and AA (χ2= 167.02, p < 
.01) regressions. 
 
4. DATA AND RESULTS 
The sample includes all American and Canadian AAA teams in the American 
Association, International League, and Pacific Coast League (n=551) and all AA teams in 
the Eastern League, Southern League, and Texas League (n=580) between 1992 and 2011. 
Data were obtained from a variety of sources including Baseball-reference.com, 
Minorleaguesource.com, and the Encyclopedia of Minor League Baseball.  There were 48 
AAA affiliation changes and 36 AA affiliation changes in the 20 year period (see Appendix 
A and B).  Tables 1 and 2 report the sample’s descriptive statistics for AAA and AA 
classifications, respectively. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The coefficients in the log-linear models are interpreted as percent changes in the 
dependent variable for each one unit change in a continuous independent variable.  When 
the independent variable is binary the coefficient is transformed as ecoefficient-1 to obtain the 
equivalent percent change in the independent variable. For ease of interpretation, the 
coefficients have been transformed in Table 3 to report the percent changes. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The results of the regression analysis are consistent with previous research showing 
MiLB team win percent associated with an increase in attendance for AA teams and an 
insignificant effect for AAA teams.  Specifically, a 0.1 unit increase in win percent—from 
0.500 to 0.600 for example—is associated with a 3.1% (p=0.02) increase in AA attendance. 
New AAA and AA stadiums are associated with significant attendance gains that persist for 
at least 10 years.  Local MLB competition in the form of a new MLB stadium within 100 
miles of a AAA team has a negative but marginally significant effect of 7% (p=0.07) for 
the five years after the stadium is built.  
Overall, a minor league team’s geographic distance to its MLB affiliate is 
insignificant at both the AAA and AA levels. However, we conduct additional analysis 
below to further explore this result.  The quality of the MLB parent club, measured as MLB 
win percent, matters as expected for AAA clubs but not for AA clubs.  A 0.1 unit increase 
in MLB winning percent—from 0.500 to 0.600 for example—is associated with a 5.5% 
increase in affiliated AAA attendance.  The status of the MLB parent club, measured as 
market population, matters for AA teams.  For every additional 1,000,000 people in the 
MLB parent club’s population, AA clubs experience a 0.8% (p=0.01) increase in 
attendance.   
In terms of switching costs, AA teams realized an 11% (p=0.006) decrease in 
attendance the season after changing their alliance partner.  No switching costs were 
associated with AAA teams.  Switching to a higher quality or status affiliation—again 
operationalized as MLB win percent, attendance, and market population—had no 
relationship with attendance for either AAA or AA teams.   
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4.1 Robustness Checks  
While there is no doubt that a new MiLB stadium is associated with increased 
attendance, there is uncertainty in the literature on how best to model those gains.  Thus, 
follow up analysis was performed to assess the robustness of the empirical results.  In our 
primary specification, we used ten separate year dummies to estimate the effects of a new 
minor league stadium as in Gitter and Rhoads (2014).  Using previous research that utilized 
alternate specifications and time periods (e.g. Agha, 2013; Roy, 2008) we developed 
multiple techniques to assess the robustness of the new minor league stadium effect.  
Regardless of the technique used, we found that the significance of every variable in the 
model was unchanged with the exception of the three AA distance variables.  Table 4 
shows the percent change and statistical significance of the three AA distance variables for 
each of the supplemental models and the original model.  Whereas parent distance, parent 
distance squared, and change in parent club distance are all insignificant in the original AA 
model, all three become significant when controlling for fewer years’ effect of a new 
stadium, regardless of whether those controls are measured through trends, a single 
dummy, or separate year dummies.  In some cases, for every 100 miles further the teams 
are separated, there is roughly a 2% (p<0.05) increase in AA attendance.  Distance squared 
is also statistically significant (p<0.05) but only affects attendance a negligible 0.01% for 
every 100 miles further apart the teams are.  When switching between MLB teams, a club 
100 miles further results in a decrease of less than 1% in AA attendance. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
5.1 Is Geographic Proximity an Important Demand Determinant?  
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The first objective of this research was to increase our understanding of demand 
factors in MiLB and determine if proximity to an MLB affiliate partner matters to MiLB 
teams. This research question is motivated in part by the recent trend for MLB teams to 
cluster their affiliated minor league teams in closer geographical proximity.  For AAA 
teams distance is insignificant.  For AA teams the answer is not as straightforward.  In 
some specifications, distance is insignificant while in others, AA teams experience a 2% 
increase in attendance for every 100 miles further they are situated from their parent MLB 
club.  Considering the average annual attendance of our AA sample was just over 250,000 
fans, such an increase is not negligible at 5,000 extra attendees each season by simply being 
located 100 miles further from the parent club.  This finding is contrary to strategic alliance 
theory that suggests several benefits to the geographic proximity of partners (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998); though we note that our results do not imply that benefits of proximity such 
as knowledge and asset sharing are nonexistent in MiLB, but rather that such benefits do 
not appear to manifest in attendance gains.  Moreover, the fact that the distance between 
alliance partners did not influence MiLB demand in several specifications is also an 
important finding.  The result suggests that MiLB team executives may be prudent to 
consider factors beyond proximity when evaluating MLB alliance prospects with an eye 
toward stimulating their team’s attendance.  The inconclusiveness of this factor at the AA 
level also marks it as a prime area for future research. 
5.2 Are Partner Quality and Status Important?  
The second objective of this research was to evaluate the significance to the MiLB 
team of the quality and status of its MLB affiliate partner.  While proximity only matters at 
the AA level, the quality of the alliance partner only matters at the AAA level.  This 
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differential influence of partner quality between levels of play can be explained by the idea 
that high profile alliances, such as MLB affiliations, have more prominent effects on 
spectators of teams closest in level of play to the major leagues.  The 5.5% increase in 
AAA attendance as its MLB parent moves from a .500 record to .600 record further 
confirms the findings of Gitter and Rhoads (2010) that AAA attendance is influenced not 
by the minor league team’s performance on the field, but rather by the achievement of their 
affiliated MLB club.  This effect supports the argument that regardless of geographic 
proximity, the brand quality of MLB parent teams is associated with their closest human 
resource partners, their AAA affiliate.   
When population is used to approximate the status of a MLB club, there are 
significant effects on the AA affiliate.  For each additional million people in the MLB 
parent club’s market population, AA clubs experience a 0.8% increase in attendance.  
Considering the standard deviations in our AA sample for MLB parent club MSA 
population was 4.5 million, the increase in AA attendance can be considerable for some 
teams.  Overall, these findings provide support for the theory that higher quality firms have 
a beneficial effect on their alliance partners (Rao and Ruekert, 1994; Wernerfelt, 1988), as 
do higher status firms in some instances (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010). 
5.3 Is there a Switching Cost?  
The third objective of this research was to determine whether a switching cost was 
evident in alliance changes and if so, if the cost of switching MLB affiliates could be 
mitigated by changes in partner proximity, quality, or status.  In fact, the act of changing 
MLB partners does have a clear switching cost at the AA level, where such a move was 
associated with losing 11% of the team’s customers compared to the previous season.  
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While previous studies have represented switching costs as consumers’ perceived obstacles 
to product or service change (e.g., Jones, Mothersbaught, and Beatty, 2002), little research 
has quantified the magnitude of switching costs on revenue.  The losses observed here are 
an important contribution to quantifying the effect of switching costs on the firm.  To that 
end, the values in professional baseball are equivalent to the higher end of switching costs 
calculated in the banking industry (Shy, 2002).  Since winning is an important determinant 
of demand at the AA level and because a new affiliation will bring a new roster of minor 
league players, changing MLB affiliates appears to be a dramatic and detrimental move for 
AA fans who perhaps are invested in the team composition that manufactures wins.  
Furthermore, the drastic loss in attendance is not attenuated by switching affiliation to a 
closer MLB team, or a team in a larger city, that wins more, or garners higher attendance.   
5.4 Overall Demand 
From a demand perspective, some results of this analysis are clear and consistent 
with prior research. First, at both levels a new stadium will increase attendance.  Second, at 
the AA level fans care about winning but at the AAA level, fans focus on the winning of 
the MLB parent club and are not concerned with their minor league team’s on-field 
success.  Furthermore, MLB teams in a minor league’s MSA will decrease attendance 
because MLB is a substitute for MiLB.  
Three new contributions to our understanding of demand in minor league baseball 
emerge from this study (summarized in Table 5).  First, there are potential downsides to 
clustering affiliated teams as AA teams may see a reduction in attendance from increased 
proximity to their MLB parent club.  Second, there are relevant implications of the quality 
and status of a MLB parent club: a winning MLB partner increases demand at AAA games 
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while a MLB partner in a larger market increases AA demand.  Finally, in terms of 
switching costs, attendance decreases by 11% when AA teams change their MLB team 
alliance.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.5 Implications 
From Table 5 it becomes immediately clear that the only alliance factor associated 
with increased AAA demand (the MLB club’s winning percent) is a factor that AAA team 
administrators have little control over.  Fortunately, the significant factors at the AA level 
are more controllable by minor league team administrators tasked with making affiliation 
changes.  Team executives at the AA level should be acutely aware of the high cost of 
changing affiliation and the potential cost of changing to a parent club in closer 
geographical proximity. 
Beyond team administrators, these results have important implications for cities 
looking to build new stadiums or bring a new minor league team to town.  In most cases, 
city managers or consultants forecast attendance demand as part of a larger cost benefit 
analysis.  If a city plans to attract or retain a AA team closer to its parent club or to switch 
its affiliation, the reduction in minor league demand should be accurately accounted for. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
This study advances the literature in minor league demand modeling by proposing 
and testing a set of MLB affiliate factors based on strategic alliance research.  The model 
specifies several important features of MLB parent clubs that should be considered in 
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future MiLB demand analysis including MLB parent club distance, win percent, 
attendance, and population. 
Perhaps the most relevant practical implications apply to minor league team 
administrators.  At the end of the season in even-numbered years, an average of 18 minor 
league teams change their affiliation (Fisher, 2012).  Whereas previously, team executives 
had little research to reference in regard to their choice of major league affiliate, this study 
indicates that MLB parent clubs with a higher winning percentage can significantly 
contribute to minor league team demand, and in the case of AAA, this factor is more 
influential than the AAA team’s own winning percentage.  However, the grass is not 
always greener with a different MLB affiliation; switching parent clubs is far from a quick 
fix to increase minor league attendance.  Changing to a parent club that wins more or is 
located in a larger market has no immediate effect on MiLB team attendance.  Furthermore, 
administrators at the AA level should temper their enthusiasm to switch affiliates because 
such a change is associated with an 11% decrease in team attendance that is not attenuated 
by improvements in MLB partner quality or status. 
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1. We do not include Class A or Rookie leagues in this analysis.  Prior literature 
demonstrates that each classification of MiLB has unique demand characteristics 
and by focusing on AAA and AA—the two highest classifications—we simplify the 
discussion so as to provide detailed analysis and maximum clarity given the 
contextual nuances. 
2. Win percent, attendance, and population are correlated for some teams.  However, 
this pattern is not uniform (e.g. the Oakland A’s are deemed a lower status club 
despite the same MSA population as the higher status San Francisco Giants since 
the A’s have lower attendance for the same win percent).  While the variables are 
correlated, analysis of the variance inflation factors (VIP) shows they do not impose 
multicolinearity on the estimation.  




Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, AAA Teams, 1992-2011, n=551 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable     
ln of annual attendance 12.95 0.34 11.72 13.93
MiLB Team 
Win percent 0.499 0.062 0.309 0.662
New MiLB stadium year 1 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 2 0.04 0.19 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 3 0.04 0.19 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 4 0.04 0.19 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 5 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 6 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 7 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 8 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 9 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 10 0.04 0.20 0 1
Controls 
Strike 94/95 dummy 0.09 0.29 0 1
New MLB stadium in past five years 0.06 0.23 0 1
Parent MLB Club Proximity, Quality, Status 
Parent distance (miles) 357 334 26 2,256
Parent distance squared 238,536 536,729 676 5,089,536
Parent win percent 0.501 0.071 0.265 0.716
Parent attendance 2,367,481 739,894 255,953 4,483,350
Parent MSA population 5,487,896 4,504,229 1,462,728 19,300,000
Change Variables 
Change in affiliation dummy 0.07 0.25 0 1
Off cycle change dummy 0.01 0.11 0 1
Change in parent distance -5 158 -1,585 2,030
Change in parent win percent -0.001 0.028 -0.234 0.229
Change in parent attendance 12,192 328,443 -2,577,938 3,259,256
Change in parent population 29,961 1,785,753 -16,100,000 16,900,000
 
  




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, AA Teams, 1992-2011, n=580 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variable     
ln of annual attendance 12.47 0.40 10.11 13.44
MiLB Team 
Win percent 0.497 0.065 0.253 0.671
New MiLB stadium year 1 0.04 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 2 0.05 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 3 0.05 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 4 0.05 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 5 0.05 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 6 0.05 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 7 0.05 0.22 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 8 0.04 0.21 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 9 0.04 0.20 0 1
New MiLB stadium year 10 0.04 0.19 0 1
Controls 
Strike 94/95 dummy 0.10 0.30 0 1
New MLB stadium in past five years 0.07 0.26 0 1
Parent MLB Club Proximity, Quality, Status 
Parent distance (miles) 663 673 27 2,883
Parent distance squared 892,872 1,511,712 729 8,311,689
Parent win percent 0.501 0.070 0.265 0.716
Parent attendance 2,321,850 742,560 255,953 4,298,655
Parent MSA population 5,555,731 4,475,205 1,462,728 19,300,000
Change Variables 
Change in affiliation dummy 0.06 0.24 0 1
Off cycle change dummy 0.00 0.04 0 1
Change in parent distance 0 307 -2,474 2,549
Change in parent win percent 0.001 0.021 -0.173 0.185
Change in parent attendance 7,938 252,555 -2,266,444 1,943,573
Change in parent population 6,557 1,470,969 -14,400,000 14,200,000
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Table 3: Effects of Major League Affiliation on Minor League Attendance, 1992-2011 
  AAA  AA 
Variable Percent change β 
Robust  





MiLB win percent 11% 0.114 0.142  31% 0.310 0.134* 
New MiLB stadium year 1 50% 0.405 0.069***  30% 0.263 0.051***
New MiLB stadium year 2 47% 0.389 0.054***  30% 0.261 0.044***
New MiLB stadium year 3 46% 0.377 0.046***  31% 0.268 0.040***
New MiLB stadium year 4 40% 0.340 0.036***  26% 0.227 0.034***
New MiLB stadium year 5 33% 0.286 0.040***  24% 0.218 0.029***
New MiLB stadium year 6 28% 0.250 0.036***  17% 0.159 0.030***
New MiLB stadium year 7 25% 0.221 0.034***  21% 0.191 0.033***
New MiLB stadium year 8 17% 0.157 0.037***  13% 0.123 0.039***
New MiLB stadium year 9 19% 0.173 0.025***  12% 0.112 0.043***
New MiLB stadium year 10 12% 0.117 0.028***  14% 0.130 0.038***
Strike 94/95 dummy 4% 0.041 0.038  7% 0.067 0.034* 
New MLB stadium in past 
five years -7% -0.069 0.039†  -2% -0.021 0.052 
Parent distance  
(per 100 miles) 1% 0.013 0.014  1% 0.013 0.011 
Parent distance squared  
(per 10,000 miles) -0.09% -0.0009 0.0006  -0.05% -0.0005 0.000 
Parent win percent 55% 0.545 0.143***  21% 0.209 0.161 
Parent attendance  
(per 100,000) -0.3% -0.003 0.002  -0.1% -0.001 0.002 
Parent MSA population  
(per 1,000,000) -0.1% -0.001 0.003  0.8% 0.008 0.003* 
Change in affiliation dummy 3% 0.033 0.035  -11% -0.114 0.041** 
Off cycle change dummy -9% -0.093 0.068  28% 0.246 0.196 
Change in parent distance  
(per 100 miles) 0.2% 0.002 0.004  -1% -0.006 0.003† 
Change in parent win percent 9% 0.090 0.330  17% 0.168 0.462 
Change in parent attendance 
(per 100,000) -0.3% -0.003 0.003  0.6% 0.006 0.004 
Change in parent population 
(per 1,000,000) 0.3% 0.003 0.006  -0.2% -0.002 0.004 
Time Trend 1% 0.012 0.002***  0% 0.003 0.002 
Constant 12.253 0.138***   11.516 0.110***
        
Observations  551  580  
R2   0.7747     0.7772   
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Note: † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. City fixed-effects are suppressed. 
 
Table 4: Robustness Check of New Stadium Variables on AA Distance Variables 
 
    Model     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Parent distance  
(per 100 miles) 1.3% 1.4% 1.5% 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 2.6%
 0.2414 0.2155 0.1627 0.114 0.0581 0.0374 0.0238 0.013
Parent distance 
squared (per 10,000 
miles) -0.05% -0.05% -0.05% -0.06% -0.07% -0.08% -0.09% -0.10%
 0.3127 0.3052 0.2378 0.1702 0.0958 0.0669 0.0453 0.0259
Change in parent 
distance (per 100 
miles) -0.63% -0.64% -0.58% -0.59% -0.71% -0.70% -0.72% -0.76%
 0.0665 0.055 0.0795 0.0722 0.0382 0.0391 0.0328 0.0265
New MiLB stadium 
yr 1 30.1% 28.4% 26.9% 25.2% 22.1% 20.3%   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002   
New MiLB stadium 
yr 2 29.9% 28.0% 26.4% 24.8% 21.9% 20.3%   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
New MiLB stadium 
yr 3 30.7% 29.0% 27.5% 25.8% 22.9% 21.1%   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
New MiLB stadium 
yr 4 25.5% 23.8% 22.3% 20.6% 17.8% 16.2%   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
New MiLB stadium 
yr 5 24.4% 22.6% 21.1% 19.6% 17.1% 15.5%   
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
New MiLB stadium 
yr 6 17.2% 15.8% 14.4% 12.9% 10.2%    
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006    
New MiLB stadium 
yr 7 21.1% 19.7% 18.4% 16.6%     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000     
New MiLB stadium 
yr 8 13.1% 11.3% 10.1%      
 0.0019 0.0056 0.0123      
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New MiLB stadium 
yr 9 11.9% 10.4%       
 0.0095 0.0202       
New MiLB stadium 
yr 10 13.8%        
 0.0007        
New MiLB stadium 
5 year dummy       16.1%  
       0.0000  
New MiLB stadium 
5 year trend        3.6%
        0.0000
 
Note: p-values are located under the percent change coefficients.  Model 1 is the same as 
Table 3; Models 2-6 reduce the number of stadium dummies; Model 7 uses a single dummy 
coded 1 for the first 5 years of a new stadium; and Model 8 uses a single trend variable for 






Table 5: Summary of Significant Alliance Variables on MiLB Demand 
Research Question Variable Level Effect on MiLB Attendance
1. Proximity Distance to MLB parent  AA 0-2.6% per 100 miles further 
2.  Quality MLB parent winning percent AAA 5.5% per .100 increase 
     Status MLB parent attendance AAA none 
     Status MLB parent population AAA 0.8% per 1,000,000 increase 





SWITCHING COSTS, PROXIMITY, & STATUS IN BASEBALL 
33 
 
Appendix A: AAA Affiliation Changes 
 
AAA team, n=48 Old affiliation New affiliation 
Vancouver Canadians 1992 Chicago White Sox 1993 Anaheim Angels 
Nashville Sounds 1992 Cincinnati Reds 1993 Chicago White Sox 
Indianapolis Indians 1992 Montreal Expos 1993 Cincinnati Reds 
Charlotte Knights 1992 Chicago Cubs 1993 Cleveland Indians 
Colorado Springs Sky Sox 1992 Cleveland Indians 1993 Colorado Rockies 
Edmonton Trappers 1992 Anaheim Angels 1993 Florida Marlins 
Buffalo Bisons 1994 Pittsburgh Pirates 1995 Cleveland Indians 
Charlotte Knights 1994 Cleveland Indians 1995 Florida Marlins 
Edmonton Trappers 1994 Florida Marlins 1995 Oakland Athletics 
Calgary Cannons 1994 Seattle Mariners 1995 Pittsburgh Pirates 
Tacoma Rainiers 1994 Oakland Athletics 1995 Seattle Mariners 
New Orleans Zephyrs 1996 Milwaukee Brewers 1997 Houston Astros 
Tucson Toros 1996 Houston Astros 1997 Milwaukee Brewers 
Tucson Sidewinders 1997 Milwaukee Brewers 1998 Arizona Diamondbacks 
Calgary Cannons 1997 Pittsburgh Pirates 1998 Chicago White Sox 
Louisville Redbirds 1997 St. Louis Cardinals 1998 Milwaukee Brewers 
Nashville Sounds 1997 Chicago White Sox 1998 Pittsburgh Pirates 
Memphis Redbirds 1997 Seattle Mariners 1998 St. Louis Cardinals 
Durham Bulls 1997 Atlanta Braves 1998 Tampa Bay Devil Rays 
Edmonton Trappers 1998 Oakland Athletics 1999 Anaheim Angels 
Charlotte Knights 1998 Florida Marlins 1999 Chicago White Sox 
Calgary Cannons 1998 Chicago White Sox 1999 Florida Marlins 
Vancouver Canadians 1998 Anaheim Angels 1999 Oakland Athletics 
Louisville RiverBats 1999 Milwaukee Brewers 2000 Cincinnati Reds 
Indianapolis Indians 1999 Cincinnati Reds 2000 Milwaukee Brewers 
Salt Lake Stingers 2000 Minnesota Twins 2001 Anaheim Angels 
Las Vegas 51s 2000 San Diego Padres 2001 Los Angeles Dodgers 
Edmonton Trappers 2000 Anaheim Angels 2001 Minnesota Twins 
Portland Beavers 2000 Colorado Rockies 2001 San Diego Padres 
Ottawa Lynx 2002 Montreal Expos 2003 Baltimore Orioles 
Rochester Red Wings 2002 Baltimore Orioles 2003 Minnesota Twins 
Edmonton Trappers 2002 Minnesota Twins 2003 Montreal Expos 
Nashville Sounds 2004 Pittsburgh Pirates 2005 Milwaukee Brewers 
Indianapolis Indians 2004 Milwaukee Brewers 2005 Pittsburgh Pirates 
New Orleans Zephyrs 2004 Houston Astros 2005 Washington Nationals 
Norfolk Tides 2006 New York Mets 2007 Baltimore Orioles 
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New Orleans Zephyrs 2006 Washington Nationals 2007 New York Mets 
Scranton/Wilkes-Barre Yankees 2006 Philadelphia Phillies 2007 New York Yankees 
Ottawa Lynx 2006 Baltimore Orioles 2007 Philadelphia Phillies 
Columbus Clippers 2006 New York Yankees 2007 Washington Nationals 
Columbus Clippers 2008 Washington Nationals 2009 Cleveland Indians 
New Orleans Zephyrs 2008 New York Mets 2009 Florida Marlins 
Albuquerque Isotopes 2008 Florida Marlins 2009 Los Angeles Dodgers 
Buffalo Bisons 2008 Cleveland Indians 2009 New York Mets 
Las Vegas 51s 2008 Los Angeles Dodgers 2009 Toronto Blue Jays 
Syracuse Chiefs 2008 Toronto Blue Jays 2009 Washington Nationals 
Oklahoma RedHawks 2010 Texas Rangers 2011 Houston Astros 
Round Rock Express 2010 Houston Astros 2011 Texas Rangers 
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Appendix B: AA Affiliation Changes 
 
AA team, n=36 Old affiliation New affiliation 
Orlando Cubs 1992 Minnesota Twins 1993 Chicago Cubs 
Hardware City Rock Cats 1994 Boston Red Sox 1995 Minnesota Twins 
Trenton Thunder 1994 Detroit Tigers 1995 Boston Red Sox 
Memphis Chicks 1994 Kansas City Royals 1995 San Diego Padres 
Wichita Wranglers 1994 San Diego Padres 1995 Kansas City Royals 
Jacksonville Suns 1994 Seattle Mariners 1995 Detroit Tigers 
Memphis Chicks 1996 San Diego Padres 1997 Seattle Mariners 
Orlando Rays 1997 Chicago Cubs 1998 Seattle Mariners 
Midland RockHounds 1998 Anaheim Angels 1999 Oakland Athletics 
New Haven Ravens 1998 Colorado Rockies 1999 Seattle Mariners 
El Paso Diablos 1998 Milwaukee Brewers 1999 Arizona Diamondbacks 
Huntsville Stars 1998 Oakland Athletics 1999 Milwaukee Brewers 
Carolina Mudcats 1998 Pittsburgh Pirates 1999 Colorado Rockies 
Erie SeaWolves 1998 Pittsburgh Pirates 1999 Anaheim Angels 
Orlando Rays 1998 Seattle Mariners 1999 Tampa Bay Devil Rays 
Erie SeaWolves 2000 Anaheim Angels 2001 Detroit Tigers 
Jacksonville Suns 2000 Detroit Tigers 2001 Los Angeles Dodgers 
San Antonio Missions 2000 Los Angeles Dodgers 2001 Seattle Mariners 
New Haven Ravens 2000 Seattle Mariners 2001 St. Louis Cardinals 
Arkansas Travelers 2000 St. Louis Cardinals 2001 Anaheim Angels 
Trenton Thunder 2002 Boston Red Sox 2003 New York Yankees 
Carolina Mudcats 2002 Colorado Rockies 2003 Florida Marlins 
Portland Sea Dogs 2002 Florida Marlins 2003 Boston Red Sox 
Norwich Navigators 2002 New York Yankees 2003 San Francisco Giants 
New Haven Ravens 2002 St. Louis Cardinals 2003 Toronto Blue Jays 
Tulsa Drillers 2002 Texas Rangers 2003 Colorado Rockies 
Tennessee Smokies 2002 Toronto Blue Jays 2003 St. Louis Cardinals 
Harrisburg Senators 2004 Montreal Expos 2005 Washington Nationals 
Tennessee Smokies 2004 St. Louis Cardinals 2005 Arizona Diamondbacks 
Tennessee Smokies 2006 Arizona Diamondbacks 2007 Chicago Cubs 
West Tenn Diamond Jaxx 2006 Chicago Cubs 2007 Seattle Mariners 
Mobile BayBears 2006 San Diego Padres 2007 Arizona Diamondbacks 
San Antonio Missions 2006 Seattle Mariners 2007 San Diego Padres 
Chattanooga Lookouts 2008 Cincinnati Reds 2009 Los Angeles Dodgers 
Carolina Mudcats 2008 Florida Marlins 2009 Cincinnati Reds 
Jacksonville Suns 2008 Los Angeles Dodgers 2009 Florida Marlins 
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